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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Amadeo'
(decided August 1, 2001)
On June 8, 2001, Jeremias Amadeo moved, pursuant to
New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 210.20(1)(c),
2
210.35(5), 3 and 190.25(6), 4 to dismiss charges filed against him of
attempted murder, assault in the first degree and assault in the
second degree, on the ground that the "Hate Crimes Act"5 is
unconstitutional.6 The defendant claimed the "Hate Crimes Act"
'No. 00-3523, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LExIS 406 (Sup. Ct. Queens County August 1,
2001).
2 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(1)(c) (McKinney 2002) provides that the
superior court may dismiss an indictment on the grounds that "[t]he grand jury
proceeding was defective, within the meaning of section 210.35 . ..."
3 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.35(5) (McKinney 2002) provides that a grand
jury proceeding is defective within 210.20 (1)(c) if "It]he proceeding otherwise
fails to conform to the requirements of article one hundred ninety to such degree
that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result."
4 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25(6) (McKinney 2001) provides in pertinent
part:
The legal advisors of the grand jury are the court and the
district attorney, and the grand jury may not seek or receive
legal advice from any other source. Where necessary or
appropriate, the court or the district attorney, or both, must
instruct the grand jury concerning the law with respect to its
duties or any matter before it ....
5 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2001). This section is also known as
the "Hate Crimes Act", which states in pertinent part:
A person commits a hate crime when he or she commits a
specified offense and either:
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in
substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the
race, color, national origin.., regardless of whether the belief
or perception is correct, or
(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the
offense in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or
perception regarding the race, color, national
origin ... regardless of whether the belief or perception is
correct.
6 Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *1-2.
1
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violated the New York Constitution,7 which guarantees freedom of
speech.8 The defendant conceded that although the "Hate Crimes
Act" did not violate the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, 9 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,o he argued that the New York Constitution
has been "construed" to provide greater protections than that of the
Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court, Queens County,
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating: "the defendant
has failed to demonstrate that New Yorkers enjoy any rights or
protections under the State Constitution that they do not enjoy
under the First Amendment." 2 Given that fact, the court held that
they were required to follow the decision in Mitchell.'3
Amadeo allegedly stabbed the complainant in the face with
a knife, causing serious injury.' 4 While standing on the A-train
subway platform, Amadeo allegedly asked the complainant if he
spoke Spanish, to which the complainant answered that he did
not. 5 Next, Amadeo asked, "what the [-]uck language" was the
complainant speaking, to which the complainant answered that he
was speaking English.' 6 After a brief dialogue, Amadeo said he
was going to kill the complainant.1 7 Amadeo proceeded to stab the
complainant in the face. 8  As the complainant was being
transferred to the hospital by ambulance, Amadeo allegedly stated
that the complainant "was a dumb stupid Mexican" and that the
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. The New York Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
SAnadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIs 406, at *2.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech ... "
'0 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
" Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIs 406, at *3.




4 1d. at *1.
15 Id.
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defendant himself "was Puerto Rican and a United States Citizen
who was from this country not like this mother[-]ucker..."'9
The defendant was arrested and charged with an eight-
count indictment, which included attempted murder in the second
degree, assault in the second degree, and assault in the first degree,
all of which were committed as "Hate Crimes" under New York
Penal Law Article 485.20 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the three "Hate Crime" counts on the grounds that the "Hate
Crimes Act" is unconstitutional, violating Article 1 Section 8 of
the New York State Constitution.21 The Attorney General for the
State of New York intervened.22
The court began by stating that there is a presumption of
constitutionality that favors legislative enactments, and that in
order to invalidate these legislative enactments, the invalidity of
the enactment must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.23
Further, the court stated that Article I Section 8 "reads differently
from its federal cousin", and it provides "different and greater
protections" than the First Amendment of the United States
24Constitution. The court added that the "burden is on the
defendant, however, to establish the specific manner in which the
State Constitution creates some independent New York right and
to establish that the Hate Crimes Act violates that right.,
25
Amadeo cited People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books26 in an attempt
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the "Hate Crimes Act"
should be held unconstitutional because it violates an individual's
freedom of speech.27 The trial court held that although the New
19 Id.
20 id.
21 Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIs 406, at *2-3. The defendant further
contended that the "Hate Crimes Act" violated his guarantee of due process
contained in Article I Section 6 of the New York State Constitution.
22 Id. at *2.
23 Id. at *3.
24 Id.
25 Id
26 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
27 Anadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXis 406, at *4-5. The defendant also cited
People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986).
The court rejected the P.J. Video argument stating that although the court of




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
York Court of Appeals broadened the rights of New York citizens,
the defendant in this case had not established beyond a reasonable
doubt that an independent New York right existed, nor that the
Hate Crimes Act violated that right.
28
In People ex rel. Arcara, the issue before the New York
Court of Appeals was whether an order to close a bookstore, in
which customers were using the store to conduct illegal sexual
acts, affected the store owner's constitutional right to freedom of
expression guaranteed under Article I section 8 of the New York
State Constitution. The owner of the bookstore was fully aware
of the activities taking place in his store, but did nothing to prevent
them from happening.30 The prosecutor applied for an order
closing the bookstore for one year, claiming the activity should be
deemed a public nuisance.3 ' The Court of Appeals held that
bookselling is a constitutionally protected activity and that closing
the store for a year would substantially impact this activity. The
Court of Appeals stated, "[t]he crucial factor in determining
whether State action affects freedom of expression is the impact of
the action on the protected activity and not the nature of the
activity which prompted the government act."33 Further the Court
of Appeals remarked, "[t]he test, in traditional terms, is not who is
aimed at but who is hit.",34 The Court of Appeals concluded that
the action requested by the government infringed upon the New
York State Constitutional right to freedom of expression because
selling books is a constitutionally protected activity, and forcing
the store to close for a year would violate this right. 5
than the U.S. Constitution, this does not necessarily mean that another article,
namely Article I Section 8 of the New York Constitution is guaranteed to grant
more rights than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court went
on to state, "P.J. Video has no relevance to the issues raised by the defendant."2 8 Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXis 406, at *5.
29 People ex rel. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 555-56, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510
N.Y.S.2d at 845.
30 Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
33 Id.
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Before the Arcara case was remanded to the New York
Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court determined
that the order sought by the prosecutor, deeming the bookstore a
public nuisance and ordering it to be closed for one year, did not
violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.36 The Court
stated that the "least restrictive means test ' 37 does not apply to
every criminal and civil case simply because each particular
remedy will have some effect on the First Amendment activities of
those subject to sanction and determined that the order sought by
the prosecutor did not violate the First Amendment.38 The Court
reasoned that the illegal sexual activity, which occurred in this case
"manifests absolutely no element of protected expression."39 The
Court further reasoned that bookselling in a building used for
prostitution does not fall under the First Amendment right to
freedom of expression.40
In People v. Dietze,4' the New York Court of Appeals held
that a statute that criminalizes abusive or obscene language
violates both the State and Federal Constitutions.42 The defendant
in Dietz referred to the complainant as a "bitch," and to the
complainant's retarded son as a "dog", and told the complainant
that she would "beat the crap out of [the complainant] some day or
night on the street. 43 The complainant Went to the-authorities and
the defendant was arrested and charged with violating former
36 Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
37 Id. at 702-703. The Court stated:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968)).
38 Id. at 706-707.
39 1d. at 705-706.
40 Id. The Court stated that allowing this claim would be similar to allowing
an incarcerated individual to claim that his First Amendment right to speak in
public areas is violated by his incarceration.
4, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989).
42 Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
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Penal Law § 240.25. 44 The New York Court of Appeals first
determined that the defendant's conduct satisfied the requisite
elements under the statute. 45  Holding New York Penal Law
§ 240.25 (2) unconstitutional, the court reasoned that some speech
might be prohibited, such as speech that by its utterance alone may
"inflict injury or tend naturally to evoke immediate violence or
other breach of the peace."46 The Court of Appeals concluded that
this statute was overbroad due to the general language of "abusive
or obscene language. 47 The court further concluded that had the
language in the statute been limited to statements made to induce
violence, the statute would not have violated either the New York
or Federal Constitution.48 Since Dietze, the unconstitutional parts
of former New York Penal Law §240.25 have been modified and
replaced by New York Penal Law §240.26. 49
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Wisconsin's "Hate Crime" Act which closely paralleled the act
challenged in Amadeo. 50 The Supreme Court held that a sentence
enhancing statute for "Hate Crimes" does not violate the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.5' In Mitchell, defendant
and others stole a "young white boy's" tennis shoes and beat him
severely, rendering him unconscious and in a coma for four 
days. 52
Just prior to the beating, the defendant made racial remarks
44 Id. Former N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25(2) stated that a person was guilty of
harassment when, "[i]n a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language , or
makes an obscene gesture."
45 Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
46 Id. at 52, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
4I ld. at 52, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
48 Id. at 52-53, 549 N.E.2d at 1168-69, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98.
49 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 2001) states in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person:
1. He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such
other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do
the same ....
5 0 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 490.
51 id. .
52 Id. at 480.
[Vol 18
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concerning the "young white boy" to the other participants. 53 The
defendant was convicted of aggravated battery but because the jury
found that the defendant had intentionally chosen the victim
because of his race, the sentence could be increased by up to five
additional years of incarceration.54 Ultimately, the judge sentenced
him to four years imprisonment for aggravated battery. Without
the sentencing enhancement statute, the defendant could only have
been sentenced to two years. 55  The defendant appealed his
conviction challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing
enhancement statute on the ground that it violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. 6 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court deemed the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that "the
Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with
which it disagrees. 5 7
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, stating that the First. Amendment does
not protect physical assault. 58  The Court :reasoned that the
"penalty-enhancement provision" upheld in Barclay v. Florida,59
which allowed a trial judge to take into account the defendant's
racial bias towards the victim during sentencing, was parallel to the
sentencing enhancement statute involved in the defendant's case. 6°
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the First Amendment does
not prohibit the "evidentiary use of speech to establish the
elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.
6
1
Moreover, in Barclay, the Supreme Court held that a trial
judge may take into account the defendant's racial animus towards
his victim. 62 The defendant and four others were members of a
group called the "BLACK LIBERATION ARMY" whose purpose
53 Id. The defendant stated: "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white
people?" and "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go
get him."54 id.
55 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480-81.
56 Id. at 481.
57 Id. at 482 (quoting State v. Mitchell 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Wis. 1992)).
58 Id. at 484.
59 463 U.S. 939 (1983).60 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 445-46.
861 Id. at 489.
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was to start a racial war. 3 On the evening of June 17, 1974, the
five men picked up a hitchhiker and killed him.64 They attached a
65note to the victim, which contained racial epithets. 8 In addition,
following the murder the defendant and the others made audiotapes
66stating that this was a racial murder. The defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury recommended a
sentence of life imprisonment.67 The trial judge found several
aggravating circumstances pursuant to Florida's Criminal
Procedure and Corrections Statute 921.141,68 and sentenced the
defendant to death.6 9  The defendant, among other claims,
contended that his sentence must be vacated because the judge
added a non-statutory aggravating circumstance, namely racial
hatred, when he discussed the reasons for the defendant's
sentence. 0
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the defendant's
argument concluding that a trial judge may take into account "the
elements of racial hatred" when determining sentencing.7' The
Court reasoned that nothing in the U.S. Constitution prohibits such
72an act by a judge so long as the judge's decision is not arbitrary.
Here, the Court deemed the judge's decision to be appropriate and
not arbitrary.73
63d. at 942.64 id.
65 Id. at 942-43.
Id. at 943-44.
67 Barclay, 463 U.S. at 944. One of the other actors was sentenced to death,
two others were convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 199 years
in prison, while the other plead guilty to second-degree murder. Id.
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001).
69 Barclay, 463 U.S. at 944-48 (noting the aggravating factors were that the
defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, § 921.141
(5)(c), had committed the murder while engaged in a kidnapping, § 921.141
(5)(d), had endeavored to disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement,
§ 921.141 (5)(g), and had been especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141
(5)(h)."). The judge further stated that the racial motive was an additional
aggravating factor. Id.
70 Id. at 948-49.
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In R.A. V. v. St. Paul74 the Supreme Court invalidated a
Minnesota "bias-motivated crime ordinance' 75 on the grounds thatu~s. 76it violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
defendant and several other teenagers allegedly placed a cross on
the yard of a black family and set it on fire. 77 'The defendant was
charged with violating the "St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance. '8  The defendant moved to dismiss the charges
asserting that the ordinance was "substantially overbroad and
impermissibly content based and therefore facially invalid under
the First Amendment. 79  The Supreme Court found that the
ordinance reached only "fighting words", but found it
unconstitutional because it prohibited speech solely on the basis of
the subjects the speech address.8 ° The Court reasoned that since
the ordinance only prohibited "fighting words" used against
disfavored people and not everyone, it violated the First
Amendment.81  The Court further determined that the
discrimination in the statute did not serve a legitimate compelling
state interest because that same interest could be served by a non-
discriminatory ordinance.82
Both the New York Constitution and the Federal
Constitution are indistinguishable pertaining to freedom of
813speech/expression. However, it seems that the New York Court
74 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
75 ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). The "St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance" states in pertinent part: "Whoever places on
public or private property a symbol.., but not limited to, a burning
cross.., which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race ... commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."76 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380-81.
77 id. at 379.
71 Id. at 380.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 381 (reasoning that the words themselves in the statute pertaining to
the illegal activities were not unconstitutional because they were "fighting
words" which are not protected by the First Amendment).
81 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (stating that although racial "fighting words" were
covered, the ordinance could not be applied equally since "fighting words" in
connection with homosexuals, for example, were not covered by the ordinance).
82 Id. at 395-96.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
of Appeals has clearly expanded the rights of its citizens pertaining
to this issue.a4 The New York Court of Appeals differs with the
U.S. Supreme Court when confronted with closing a bookstore
because of the illegal sexual activities occurring inside.85 These
two inconsistent opinions pertaining to the same constitutional
right indicate that New York courts are willing to expand the
freedom of speech provision in its constitution, while the Supreme
Court has denied such rights when pertaining to the U.S.
Constitution.86
Although the New York Court of Appeals was willing to
expand Article I, Section 8 of the New York Constitution to
include the prohibition of the closing of a bookstore which had
illegal acts occurring within its premises, the Supreme Court,
Criminal Term, Queens County was not willing to enlarge this
freedom of expression to include individuals who intentionally
choose their victims based on hatred.87 It appears clear that the
New York courts are not willing to declare that the "Hate Crimes
Act" or other sentencing enhancement acts violate Article I § 8 of
the New York State Constitution.88 Although the New York Court
of Appeals is willing to expand its citizens' right to freedom of
expression in certain circumstances, it is not willing to expand this
right when it involves "hate crimes." 89
Erik Lindemann
See Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 557-58, 503 N.E.2d at 496, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847;
see also Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.85 id.
86 ld.
87 See Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 557-58, 503 N.E.2d at 496, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847;
see also Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. at 3.
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